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We propose a model for demonstrating spontaneous emergence of collective intelligent behavior
from selfish individual agents. Agents’ behavior is modeled using our proposed selfish algorithm
(SA) with three learning mechanisms: reinforced learning (SAL), trust (SAT ) and connection
(SAC). Each of these mechanisms provides a distinctly different way an agent can increase the
individual benefit accrued through playing the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) with other agents.
The SA provides a generalization of the self-organized temporal criticality (SOTC) model and
shows that self-interested individuals can simultaneously produce maximum social benefit from their
decisions. The mechanisms in the SA are self-tuned by the internal dynamics and without having
a pre-established network structure. Our results demonstrate emergence of mutual cooperation,
emergence of dynamic networks, and adaptation and resilience of social systems after perturbations.
The implications and applications of the SA are discussed.
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Emergence of Network Reciprocity, Resilience
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we address the problem of resolving
the paradox of cooperative behavior emerging in situa-
tions in which individuals are assumed to act solely in
their own self interest, that is, selfishly. This particular
paradox has a long history and has been widely studied in
sociology and in the cognitive sciences. Game theory has
been among the leading descriptors of normative behav-
ior in this regard. In particular, the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Game (PDG) has been a leading metaphor for the study
of the evolution of cooperative behavior in populations in
which selfishness is substantially rewarded in the short-
term [1, 2]. Herein we integrate the PDG behavior into
a recently developed model of self-organized behavior [3],
but before we become immersed in the formalization of
our proposed model, we examine the behavior of interest
from a qualitative perspective.
It is nearly two centuries since Lloyd [4] introduced the
tragedy of the commons scenario to highlight the lim-
itations of human rationality in a social context. We
subsequently update this scenario to modern situations
in which individuals, with self-centered interests, must
share a common resource. If each individual acts self-
ishly, without regard for the others sharing the resource,
the unavoidable result will be the depletion of resources
and subsequent tragedy. There is still much to be gained
in reviewing the original scenario before adapting it to
our present concerns. The ’commons’ is an old-English
term for a land area whose use is open to the public.
Lloyd considered a pasture to be a commons, which is
shared by a number of cattle herders, each of which re-
tains as many cattle as possible. External factors such as
∗Corresponding author: koroshm@andrew.cmu.edu
wars, disease, poaching and so on, act to keep the num-
ber of men and beasts well below the maximum level that
can be safely supported by the commons. The dynamic
response to these disruptions is robust, but eventually, so-
cial stability ensues. However, instead of enhancing the
well being of the situation, the stability inevitably leads
to tragedy. How does this counterintuitive development
arise?
In Lloyd’s argument, the assumption is made that all
herdsmen act rationally. On the socially stable commons,
rationality leads to a herdsman acting in his own self-
interest in order to maximize the gain made from grazing
and selling his cattle. He reasons that, on the downside,
to grow his herd incurs certain costs, the purchase price
and the incremental cost of overgrazing, by adding an-
other animal to his herd. On the upside, the overgrazing
cost is shared by all the herdsmen on the commons. Con-
sequently, since he does not share with others the profit of
selling this additional animal, it makes economic sense for
him to add the animal to his herd. This argument is valid
for adding additional animals as well. This same conclu-
sion is independently reached by each of the other herds-
men on the commons, since they are equally rational; re-
sulting in tragedy, since with the growing herds the com-
mons grazing capacity will inevitably be destroyed over
time. The herdsman are trapped in a rational system
that logically compels them to increase, without limit,
the size of their herd and to do this in the face of lim-
ited resources. Disaster and failure is the end point of
this logical sequence in which all participants act in their
own self-interest.
One can find a number of weak points in this arcane
argument, which we pose here as questions. Do people al-
ways (or ever) behave strictly rationally? Do individuals
ever act independently of what others in their commu-
nity are doing? Do people typically completely disregard
the effects of their actions on the behavior of others? We
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2subsequently address each of these questions and others
in a more general context. For the moment it is suffi-
cient to point out that the ”straw man” of the tragedy
of the commons is an example of linear logical thinking
and its deadly flaw is the unrealistic way it is applied to
resolving paradoxes in our complex world.
a. The Altruism Paradox Altruism is one concept
that was missing from Lloyd’s tragedy of the commons
discussion, but which seems to be no less important than
the notion of selfishness, which was foundational to his
argument. Moreover, if selfishness is entailed by rational-
ity in decision making, as he maintained, then altruism
must be realized through an irrational mechanism in de-
cision making. In point of fact, the competition between
the two aspects of human decision making [5, 6], the ra-
tional and irrational, may well save the commons from
ruin.
Let us consider the altruism paradox (AP ), which iden-
tifies a self-contradictory condition regarding the charac-
teristics of species. This dates back to Darwin’s recogni-
tion that some individuals in a number of species act in
a manner that although helpful to other members of the
species, may jeopardize their own survival. Yet this prop-
erty is often characteristic of that species. He also iden-
tified such altruism as contradicting his theory of evo-
lution, the natural selection [7]. Darwin also proposed a
resolution to this problem by speculating that natural se-
lection is not restricted to the lowest element of the social
group, the individual, but can occur at all levels of a bi-
ological hierarchy, which constitutes multilevel selection
theory [8].
As discussed by West et al. [9] the theory of sociobiol-
ogy was developed in the last century for the purpose of,
at least in part, explaining how and why Darwin’s the-
ory of biological evolution is compatible with sociology.
Wilson and Wilson [8] were able to demonstrate the con-
vergence of scientific consensus on the use of multilevel
selection theory to resolve the AP in sociobiology. Rand
and Nowak [10] emphasize that natural selection sup-
presses the development of cooperation unless it is bal-
anced by specific counter mechanisms. Five such mecha-
nism found in the literature are: multilevel selection, spa-
tial selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity and
kin selection. In their paper they discuss models of these
mechanisms, as well as, the empirical evidence support-
ing their existence in situations where people cooperated,
but in the context of evolutionary game theory. The res-
olution of such fundamental problems as the AP may be
identified at the birth of each of the scientific disciplines;
new perspectives designed to ignore large domains of sci-
ence thought to be irrelevant within the narrow confines
of the new discipline. The complexity of a given phe-
nomenon can therefore be measured by the number of
different disciplines interwoven to describe its behavior.
b. Prisoner’s Dilemma Game The PDG dates
back to the early development of game theory [11], and
is a familiar mathematical formulation of the essential
elements of many social situations involving cooperative
TABLE I: The general payoffs of PDG. The first value
of each pair is the payoff of agent i and the second value
is the payoff of the agent j.
Player j
C D
Player i
C (R,R) (S, T )
D (T, S) (P, P )
behavior. PDGs are generally represented with a payoff
matrix that provides payoffs according to the actions of
two players (see Table I). When both players cooperate,
each of them gains the payoff R, and when both players
defect, each of them gains P . If in a social group agents
i and j play the PDG, when i defects and j cooperates,
i gains the payoff T and j gains the payoff S and when
the decisions are switched, so too are the payoffs. The
constraints on the payoffs in the PDG are T > R >
P > S and S + T < 2R. The temptation to defect is
established by setting the condition T > R.
The dilemma arises from the fact that although it is
clear that for a social group (in the short-term) and for an
individual (in the long-term) the optimal mutual action
is for both to cooperate, each individual is tempted to
defect because that decision elicits the higher immediate
reward to the individual defecting. But, assuming the
other player also acts to selfishly maximize her own ben-
efit, the pair will end up in a defector-defector situation,
having the minimum payoff P for both players. How do
individuals realize that cooperation is mutually beneficial
in the long-term? This question has been answered by
many researchers, at various levels of inquiry, involving
pairs of agents [2? ], as well as, larger social networks
[1]. Research suggests that, at the pair level, people dy-
namically adjust their actions according to their observa-
tions of each others’ actions and outcomes; at the com-
plex dynamic network or societal level, this same research
suggests that the emergence of cooperation may be ex-
plained by network reciprocity, whereby individuals play
primarily with those agents with whom they are already
connected in a network structure. The demonstration of
how social networks and structured populations with ex-
plicit connections foster cooperation was introduced by
Nowak and May [13]. Alternative models based on net-
work reciprocity assume agents in a network play the
PDG only with those agents to whom they have specific
links. Agents act by copying the strategy of the richest
neighbor, basing their decisions on the observation of the
others’ payoffs. Thus, network reciprocity depends on
the existence of a network structure (an already prede-
fined set of links among agents) and on the awareness of
the behavior and payoffs of interconnected agents.
c. Empirical evidence of emergence of cooperation
Past research has supported the conclusion that the sur-
vival of cooperators requires the observation of the ac-
tions and/or outcomes of others and the existence of pre-
defined connections (links) among agents. Indeed, empir-
3ical work suggests that the survival and growth of coop-
eration within the social group depends on the level of
information available to each agent [14]. The less infor-
mation about other agents available, the more difficult
it is for cooperative behavior to emerge [11, 14]. On the
other hand, other experiments suggest that humans do
not consider the payoffs to others when making their de-
cisions, and that a network structure does not influence
the final cooperative outcome [15]. In fact, in many as-
pects of life, we influence others through our choices and
the choices of others affect us, but we are not necessarily
aware of the exact actions and rewards received by oth-
ers that have affected us. For example, when a member
of society avoids air travel in order to reduce their car-
bon footprint, s/he might not be able to observe whether
others are reducing their air travel as well, yet they rely
on decisions others make, influencing the community as a
whole. Thus, it is difficult to explain how behaviors can
be self-perpetuating even when the source of influence is
unknown [14].
These empirical observations support an important hy-
pothesis emerging from the work presented herein. Our
hypothesis is that mutual cooperation emerges and sur-
vives, even when the social group consists exclusively of
selfish agents and there is no conscious awareness of the
payoffs to other agents. Moreover a network structure
can emerge dynamically from the connections formed and
guided by individual selfishness. Note that this is the dy-
namics of a network, as distinct from the more familiar
dynamics on a network. The dynamics on a network
assumes a static network structure, as in evolutionary
game theory, whereupon the strengths of the links be-
tween agents may change, but the agents sit at the nodes
of the network and interact with the same nearest neigh-
bors. On the other hand, the dynamics of a networks
makes no such assumption and the dynamics consist of
the formation and dissolution of links between any two
agents within the social group.
II. CONTRIBUTIONS
Herein, we aim to clarify how collective intelligence
emerges without explicit knowledge of the actions and
outcomes of others, and in the absence of a predefined
network structure linking agents within a society. We
introduce an algorithm (the Selfish Algorithm, SA) to
demonstrate that collective intelligence can emerge and
survive between agents in a social group, out of selfish-
ness. We construct a computational model of the SA and
generate simulations of the evolution of mutual coopera-
tion and networks out of selfishness.
First, the SA model provides a resolution of the altru-
ism paradox (AP ) and shows how agents create a self-
organized critical group out of individual selfish behav-
ior, simultaneously maximizing the benefit of individual
and of the whole group. Second, the SA model demon-
strates how adaptation can naturally emerge from the
same mechanisms in the model. Adaptation is an im-
portant property of living things, which allows them to
respond to a changing environment in a way that opti-
mizes their performance and survivability.
We studied four systems governed with different learn-
ing mechanisms proposed by the SA, where the behavior
of the agents is modeled using three modes of learning:
reinforced learning (SAL), trust (SAT ), and connection
(SAC). The first system studied has only the SAL mech-
anism active. The other three systems are a combination
of SAL and SAT (SALT ), SAL and SAC (SALC),
and the combination of all the mechanisms (SALTC).
Next, we tested the sensitivity of the collective behavior
that emerged from these systems to changes in the so-
cial makeup by modifying a fraction of the agents having
them exchanged with zealots at a given time. A zealot
is an agent that will not change its decision regardless of
the payoff. The comparison of the mutual cooperation of
the systems versus the number of the zealots is a mea-
sure of resilience, or robustness (i.e., the resistance of the
collective behavior to perturbations).
The computational results show that these systems can
be ranked from strongest to weakest in their resilience as
SALTC>SALC>SALT>SAL. The SALC and SALTC
systems have a high resilience because using SAC in the
decision making process enables agents to learn to avoid
pairing with the zealots. This way of pairing is different
from the popular mechanism of preferential attachment
[16], which uses rules according to which an agent would
have a higher chance of linking with other agents that
already have many links, those being agents with a sub-
stantial reputation. In contrast, the SA demonstrates
that such chances to connect to other agents emerge dy-
namically, according to the experienced benefits that the
other agent brings to the individual’s own benefit (SAC).
This high adaptability of SA shows that each agent can
be observed to act as a local leader, making decisions
based on changes in its environment toward maximizing
its own benefit and, at the same time, the local deci-
sions made by agents also affect the choices taken by the
system as a whole, leading it to its optimal state.
a. Network reciprocity and survival of cooperators
To put our contributions in perspective, let us highlight
the main differences between the SA model and those of
previous studies. First, the works following the strategy
of the Nowak-May agents [13] typically compare their in-
dividual payoff with the payoffs of the other agents when
making their next decision. One way to realize this strat-
egy is to adopt the decision of the most successful neigh-
bor. In contrast, all the updates in the SA are based
on the last two payoffs to the self-same individual. In
other words, SA agents do not rely on information about
the other members of society to determine its evolution.
SA agents are connected to other agents, only indirectly,
through their local payoffs in time. The most recent pay-
off to the individual is the result of its interaction with
its most recent partner, but its previous payoff, used for
tuning its tendencies (presented below in Equation 1),
4FIG. 1: The colors on the left and right panel show the average of the ratio of Mutual Cooperation (RMC) at time
100, when each agent played the PDG for 100 times with its eight nearest neighbors, and updated its decision by
imitating the decision of the richest neighbor (including themselves). The agents were located on a regular
two-dimensional lattice of size 10×10 (left panel) and 30×30 (right panel). The horizontal axis of the panels shows
the degree of temptation to cheat experienced by the agents and the vertical axis is the ratio to initial cooperators
on the lattice. 100 ensembles were was used to evaluate the average RMC at time 100.
FIG. 2: Left panel: The time evolution of the Ratio of Mutual Cooperation (RMC) for agents located on a regular
two-dimensional lattice with 10×10 (black curve) and 30×30 agents (red curve). Initially 75% of agents randomly
picked to be cooperators and at each time agents played PDG with Tc = 0.25 with their 8 nearest neighbors and
imitated the decision of its richest neighbor (including themselves). Right panel: The time evolution of the RMC
for the agents with similar condition as those adopted in the left panel except that at each time two agents are
picked randomly and played PDG (no predefined connections). The curves are averaged over 100 realizations.
might be the result of playing with a different partner.
Second, the Nowak-May agents [13] are assumed to be
located at the nodes of a lattice and to be connected by
links, as they were also assumed to be in the decision
making model (DMM) [9]. For example, because of so-
cial interactions these lattice networks are regularly used
to model complex networks and have historically been
assumed to mimic the behavior of real social systems.
These studies emphasized the important role of network
complexity in sustaining, or promoting, cooperation [17].
This was accomplished without explicitly introducing a
self-organizing mechanism for the network formation it-
self.
To show the importance of the specific connection of
agents on a lattice in Nowak and May [13] model, we
replicated their simulation work. In this simulation the
agents are located on a regular two-dimensional lattice,
each having eight nearest neighbors to play the PDG.
There is an agent located at each node of the lattice and
they each update their decision at each round of the com-
5putation by imitating the decision of the richest agent
in their neighborhood (including themselves). Figure 1
shows our replication of their work. The colors on the
panels indicate the average of the Ratio of Mutual Coop-
eration (RMC) which sustained between the agents lo-
cated on the 10×10 lattice (left panel) and on the 30×30
lattice (right panel) after each agent played 100 times
with its eight nearest neighbors. The yellow areas corre-
spond to high RMC which happened for low temptation
to cheat Tc (i.e., agent’s selection of the Defect action in
the PDG) and high initial number of cooperators. The
yellow area is more extended in the case of agents located
on the larger lattice of size 30×30 (right panel).
To explicitly show the importance of Nowak and May’s
assumption of the lattice structure for survival of mutual
cooperation, we ran their model and compared time evo-
lution of the RMC between these agents in the case where
the agents were paired up randomly. The left panel of
Figure 2 shows the ensemble average of 100 simulations
for 100 agents (black curve) and 900 agents (red curve)
connected on a two-dimensional lattice. At each time
round, each agent plays the PDG, with a low tempta-
tion to cheat Tc(= 0.25), with all its eight neighbors.
Initially 75% of the agents were cooperators, but the
RMC evolved and sustained in both cases. The right
panel of Figure 2 shows the results of the same exper-
iment, but selecting the interacting pairs randomly (no
lattice structure is assumed for the agents). As shown
in the figure, the RMC vanishes in the absence of the
network structure.
As we demonstrate next, the SA does not rely on a
lattice network, yet, mutual cooperation is subsequently
shown to emerge and survive the induce of perturbations.
In fact, we show that the network reciprocity can be in-
terpreted to be a byproduct of SA, emerging out of the
selfishness of the SA agents.
III. THE SELFISH ALGORITHM (SA)
The selfish algorithm (SA) proposed in this re-
search belongs to a family of agent-based models in mod-
ern evolutionary game theory [18]. Specifically, SA rep-
resents a generalization of a model introduced by Mah-
moodi et al. [3] which is a coupling of DMM with evo-
lutionary game theory put into a social context. This
earlier introduction led to the self-organized temporal
criticality (SOTC) concept and the notion that a social
group could and would adjust their behavior to achieve
consensus, interpreted as a form of group intelligence, as
had been suggested by the collective behavior observed
in animal studies [19]. The SOTC agents, like Nowak
and May’s agents [13], assumes a pre-existing network
between the agents which use the DMM (belonging to
the Ising universality class of models for decision making
[20]). SA overcomes this limitation, resulting in a gen-
eral model for emergence of collective intelligence and a
complex dynamic network.
The general notion that the SA adopted from Mah-
moodi et al. [3] is that an agent i makes a decision
according to the change in a cumulative tendency (i.e.,
preference). The change in this cumulative tendency, ∆,
is a function of the last two payoffs of agent i who played
with agent j and k:
∆i,jk = χ
Πij(t)−Πik(t− 1)
|Πij(t)|+ |Πik(t− 1)| , (1)
where χ is a positive number that represents the sensi-
tivity of the agent to its last two payoffs. The quantity
Πij(t) is the payoff to the agent i played with agent j at
time t and Πik(t− 1) is the payoff to the agent i played
with agent k at time t − 1. We used the S value in the
PDG that is > 0 and assumed ∆i,jk = 0 when the de-
nominator of Eq. ( 1) is zero.
A simplified version of the SA was previously intro-
duced elsewhere [21], and an abbreviated version of the
algorithm and its mathematical details are included in
Appendix A. In the first cycle of the SA, a pair of ran-
domly selected agents i and j ”agree” to play. Only one
pair of agents play at each time cycle. Each of the agents
of a pair engages in three decisions; each decision is rep-
resented in a learning mechanism (a cumulative propen-
sity lever, ranging from 0 to 1) by which the agent can
gain information about the social environment: learning
from their own past outcomes (Selfish Algorithm Learn-
ing, SAL), trust the decision of other agents (Selfish Al-
gorithm Trust, SAT ), and make social connections that
are beneficial (Selfish algorithm-based connection, SAC).
Each of these levers is updated according to the agent’s
self interest (selfishness): a decision is made according to
the state of each lever, and the lever is updated according
to ∆ as formalized in Eq. ( 1).
In the SAL mechanism, an agent decides to cooper-
ate (C) or defect (D) while playing the PDG with the
paired partner, according to the state of the cumulative
propensity of playing C or D. The cumulative propen-
sity of the agent to pick C or D increases (or decreases) if
it’s payoff is increased (or decreased) with respect to its
previous payoff, as per Eq. ( 1). The updated cumula-
tive tendency to play C or D with the same agent is used
for the next time agent i is paired with the same agent
j. Our simulation results show that the SAL mechanism
attracts the agents toward mutual cooperation.
In the SAT decision, an agent decides to rely on the
decision of its partner, instead of using its own decision
made using SAL, according to the state of the cumula-
tive propensity of ”trusting” the other’s decision or not.
Each SAT agent can tune this propensity to rely on its
partner’s decision according to ∆ as formalized in Eq.
( 1). The SAT agent increases (or decreases) its ten-
dency to trust its partner’s decision if it increased (or
decreased) its payoff with respect to its previous payoffs.
Our simulation results show that the SALT (both SAL
and SAT active) mechanism amplifies the mutual coop-
eration between the agents regardless of the value of the
incentive to cheat Tc.
6TABLE II: The payoffs of the PDG. The first value of
each pair is the payoff of agent i and the second value is
the payoff of the agent j.
Player j
C D
Player i
C (1, 1) (0, 1 + Tc)
D (1 + Tc, 0) (0, 0)
Finally, the SAC is a decision of an agent to pick the
partner with whom to play in each round. Each SAC
agent can tune its propensity of selecting its partner ac-
cording to ∆ as formalized in Eq. ( 1). A SAC agent
increases (or decreases) its tendency of playing with the
same partner if the payoff received after playing with that
partner is higher (or lower) than the agent’s own previ-
ous payoffs. Our simulation results show that a network
of connections emerge over time between SAC agents,
and that this network amplifies the mutual cooperation
between agents.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
We studied 20 agent system and set the parameters for
the calculations as follows: Initially all the agents were
defectors, had payoff of zero, a propensity of 0.9 to remain
a defector, propensity of 0 to trust the partner’s decision,
and equal propensity of 1/(20-1) to connect with each of
the other agents. We set the sensitivity coefficient to
χ = 200. The parameter χ controls the magnitude of
the changes of the cumulative tendencies at each update
where we set the maximum and minimum of the cumu-
lative tendencies to be 1000 and 0, respectively. As a
boundary condition, if the updated cumulative tendency
goes beyond 1000 (or below 0) then it is set back to 1000
(or 0). A smaller χ, with respect to the maximum value
of the cumulative tendency, slows down the process of
learning, but it does not qualitatively change behavior,
but merely scales the dynamical properties of the system.
The time for simulations are picked to be sufficiently long
to show the asymptotic behavior of the systems.
The payoff matrix used in the simulations is shown in
Table II as suggested by Gintis [22]: R = 1, P = 0 and
S = 0. So, the maximum possible value of T = 1 + Tc
is 2. We selected the value Tc = 0.9 (unless otherwise
explicitly mentioned) which provides a strong incentive
to defect. This simple payoff matrix has the spirit of the
PDG and allows us to emphasize the main properties of
the SA model.
A. Emergence of mutual cooperation by SAL
In this section we demonstrate that the learning mech-
anism of SAL attracts agents, playing the PDG, to a
FIG. 3: Each curve shows the time evolution of the
Ratio of Mutual Cooperation (RMC) for 20 agents
used SAL and played the PDG with
Tc = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 corresponding to the black,
red, blue, green and purple curves, respectively.
state of mutual cooperation. Figure 3 shows the time evo-
lution of the RMC in simulations where the 20 agents,
randomly partnered in each cycle, used only the SAL
mechanism to update their decisions. The RMC in-
creased from zero and asymptotically saturates to a value
that depends on the value of the temptation to cheat Tc.
The smaller the Tc value the higher the saturated RMC
value and the greater the size of the collective coopera-
tion. Using SAL, each agent learns, by social interactions
with the other agents, to modify its tendency to play C
or D. These agents are connected through their payoffs.
Each agent compares its recent payoff with its previous
one, which, with high propensity, earned by playing with
a different agent. This mutual interaction between the
selfish agents led them to form an intelligent group that
learns the advantage of mutual cooperation in a freely
connected environment whose dynamics are represented
by the PDG.
To explain how the collective cooperation emerges, we
looked into the evolution of the propensities to cooperate
between two selected agents (among 20). Figure 4 depicts
the time evolution of the propensity of two agents to
pick cooperation (C) in the PDG. The propensity of
agent 1 to cooperate with agent 2 (drawn in red), and the
propensity of agent 2 to cooperate with agent 1 (drawn in
black). Generally, we observe a high correlation between
the propensities to cooperate between the two agents.
The left panel presents these propensities when the
temptation to defect is Tc = 0.9, and the right panel
presents the propensities when the temptation to defect
is Tc = 0.1. The correlation between the propensity of
the two agents is 0.65 for Tc = 0.9 and 0.84 for Tc = 0.1.
The correlation between the agents is the result of the
learning process between them. Let’s assume Tc = 0.5
and that agent 1 played C and agent 2 played D at time
7FIG. 4: The curves show the time evolution of the propensity of agent 1 to play as C with agent 2 (red curve)
(PC12) and the propensity of agent 2 to play as C with agent 1 (black curve) (PC21). Agents 1 and two are among
20 agents using SAL to update their decisions and had Tc = 0.9 (left panel) and Tc = 0.1 (right panels).
t which results in payoffs of 0 and 1.5 for them, respec-
tively. Comparing its payoff with its previous payoff,
earned playing with other agent (= 1.5, 0, 1 or 0), agent
1 would change its accumulative tendency to play C for
next time it is randomly paired with player 2 by −χ, 0,
−χ or 0. This means that agent 1 reacts to the defective
behavior of agent 2 by tending to behave D and conse-
quently agent 2 wouldn’t continue to have the advantage
of a cooperative environment. On the other hand, agent
2 would change its accumulative tendency to play D with
agent 1 by 0, χ, 0.2χ or χ. This means agent 2 would
like to play as D next time it pairs with agent 1. So,
both agents learn to play D with one another, leading
to coordination state of DD where both get payoff of
0. Such pairs compare this payoff (= 0) with their pre-
vious payoff, played with other agent, and would change
their accumulative tendency to play D by −χ, 0, −χ or 0
which shift their future decisions toward the coordination
state of CC. These agents would change their tendency
to play C by −0.2χ, χ, 0 or χ which favors their stay
as C toward one another. However, because of the time
to time change of −0.2χ (depending on the value of Tc)
in the accumulative tendency to play C with other pairs,
there is always a chance for agents to play D for a while,
before they are pulled back by other agents to behave
as C. This creates a dynamic equilibrium between CC
and DD states and defines the level of emerged mutual
cooperation observed in Figure 3. Thus, the dual dy-
namic interaction, based on self-interest, between each
agent and its environment causes the emergence of mu-
tual cooperation between the agents who play PDG and
use SAL to update their decisions. Note that in human
experiments, humans learning from only their own out-
comes without awareness of the partners’ outcomes did
not lead to mutual cooperation [14] as the rational agents
of SAL can do. High correlation between the propensi-
ties of the pairs of the agents using SAL means high co-
ordination between their decisions which also can occur
if the ”Trust” mechanism is active between the agents.
Trust lowers the intermediate CD pairings and leads the
agents to coordinate and converge in the same decision.
In the next section we show that combining SAL with
SAT amplifies the RMC between the agents. Our cur-
rent experimental work [23] also confirms that adding the
trust mechanism in decision making experiments with of
human pairs helped them to realize the advantage of mu-
tual cooperation.
B. Enhancement of Mutual Cooperation by SALT ;
Trust as a Dynamic Decision
Figure 5 shows the enhancing effect on the emergence
of collective cooperation when each agent is allowed to
make a decision whether to ”Trust” or rely on the deci-
sion made by the paired agent or not (SAT ).
The SALT mechanism also decreases the time for
agents to realize the benefit of mutual cooperation. In
Figure 6 we compare the ratio of CD partners in a group
of 20 agents playing the PDG with a temptation to cheat
of Tc = 0.9 when using the SALT model (dashed lines)
and when using the SAL model (solid lines). It is appar-
ent that because of the trust mechanism, SALT agents
coordinate more often than they do without it and con-
sequently avoid the formation of CD pairs. We also plot
the ratio of DD pairs for the two systems. These curves
show that SALT agents learn to select CC pairs over CD
pairs more readily than do SAL agents, thereby pushing
the RMC up to approximately 0.9. The average correla-
tion between the propensity of two agents to play C with
one another is about 0.92 when Tc = 0.9 which is a sign
of high coordination. We highlighted the difference be-
tween trust used in the literature with our dynamic trust
model in Appendix C.
8FIG. 5: Each curve shows the time evolution of the
Ratio of Mutual Cooperation (RMC) for 20 agents
using SALT and playing the PDG with
Tc = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 corresponding to the black,
red, blue, green, and purple curves, respectively.
FIG. 6: The solid black and the solid red curves show,
respectively, the time evolution of the ratio of CD and
CD pairs played PDG and used SALT to make
decision. The dashed black and dashed red curves show,
respectively, the time evolution of the ratio of CD and
CD pairs played PDG and used SALT to make
decision. M = 20, Tc = 0.9.
C. Emergence of network reciprocity from SALC
and SALTC
By activating the ability of the agents to make deci-
sions about the social connections that are beneficial to
themselves (SAC), we expect that an even larger and
faster increase in collective cooperation. The Connec-
tion mechanism allows each agent to select a partner that
helped the agent to increase its payoff with respect to its
previous payoff.
We demonstrate the increase in the RMC for a model
without the Trust mechanism SALC and a model with
the Trust mechanism SALTC. The Left panel of Figure 7
shows an increase in the RMC of the agents using SALC
(left panel), and using SALTC (right panel). When com-
paring the SALC model behavior to that of the agents
without the connection mechanism (paired randomly) in
Figure 3, we observe that the dependence on the tempta-
tion to cheat Tc is weaker. For example at time t = 10
6
the average RMC for the agents using SALC are about
0.84, 0.80, 0.75, 0.65 and 0.62 for Tc = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7
and 0.9, respectively, whereas for the agents using SAL
the average RMC for the same conditions are about 0.76,
0.64, 0.58, 0.52 and 0.45, respectively. On the right panel
of Figure 7, we observe that using the Learning, Trust,
and Connection mechanism in conjunction (SALTC),
the level of collective cooperation is the highest with the
least dependence on the temptation to cheat.
To show that the reciprocity emerged between the
agents using the SAC mechanism, we plotted in Fig-
ure 8 the propensities of making connections between a
typical agent (agent 1) and the other 19 agents where
agents used SALC (left panel) or SALTC (right panel)
to update their decisions. In both cases, these figures
show that agent 1 developed a preferential partner and
learned to play most of the time with one of the agents
among others.
The manner in which the network develops over time is
schematically depicted in Figure 9. This figure shows the
recorded connection propensities between 20 SA agents
at three time periods. Intensity of the lines between pairs
show the magnitude of the propensity of one to connect
to the other and the directions show the intensity belongs
to which agent and towards which one.
The colors of the nodes represent the state of the agents
at that time, red as defector and green as cooperator.
The figure shows the connections among the agents at
t = 101 (left panel), passing through an intermediate
state (middle panel, t = 103) and after reaching dynamic
equilibrium (right panel, t = 105). The preferential con-
nections forming the dynamic network emerge here over
time and are based on the perception of the benefit that
an agent receives from other agents, with whom it in-
teracts. Some connections become stronger whereas oth-
ers become weaker according to the SAC mechanism.
In [21] we showed that SAC creates a complex tempo-
ral network with an inverse power law (IPL) probability
density function (PDF ) 1/pβ of the propensity p of mak-
ing connections between agents with IPL index β = 1.3.
The IPL PDF is very different from the Poisson PDF ,
the latter having an exponentially diminishing probabil-
ity of changing the propensity compared with the much
greater IPL value. Consequently, the propensity of form-
ing a link between partners is much greater for the IPL
and the SAC forms a much more complex network than
does a Poisson PDF .
In the next section we study the adaptability of social
systems ruled by different steps of the SA. Disrupting
these systems is done by changing some agents to zealots
9FIG. 7: Each curve shows the time evolution of the Ratio of Mutual Cooperation (RMC) for 20 agents used SALC
(left panel) or SALC (right panel) and played the PDG with Tc = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 corresponding to the black,
red, blue, green and purple curves, respectively.
FIG. 8: Left and right panels show the time evolution of the propensity of pairings between agent 1 and the other 19
agents when agents used SAC or SALTC, respectively. Agents had Tc = 0.9.
and tracking the changes among the remaining agents in
response to the zealots.
D. Complex adaptation of a selfish organization
To investigate the dynamics of the SA agents we dis-
rupt the stable behavior pattern emerging from the social
group by fixing a fraction f = 0.5 of the N = 20 agents
to be zealots and calculating the response of the remain-
ing agents. A zealot is an agent whose properties are:
zero tendency to be a Cooperator; zero trust to other
agents; and a uniform tendency to play the PDG with
other agents. This divides the system into two subsys-
tems: a fraction f = 0.5 of the agents that continue to
evolve based on SAL, SALT , SALC or SALTC (sub-
system S) and (1−f)N agents as zealots (subsystem S).
We investigate how the remaining fN agents of system
S adapt to the new environment by various modes of
learning. The degree to which these agents can sustain
their mutual cooperation in the presence of the zealots is
a measure of their resilience, or its compliment is a mea-
sure of their fragility, a fundamental property of complex
networks subject to perturbation.
To track the behavioral changes of the agents in S
from those in S we study the chance of an event happen-
ing within a given SA cycle. This could be the chance
of finding the pairings Cooperation-Cooperation, Trust-
Trust, etc. In previous sections we used the ratio of
events, which was useful as there was no perturbation
in the systems to detect. To evaluate the chance of the
event occurring we used ensemble averages over 103 re-
alizations of each simulation.
The blue and orange curves in the panels of Figure 10
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FIG. 9: Emergence of reciprocity from dynamics of the network. From left to right the panels show the snapshots of
the propensities of connections between 20 agents played the PDG and updating their decisions based on SALTC
at t = 1, 5× 103 and 5× 105, respectively. Intensity of the lines between pairs represent the magnitude of the
propensity of one to another and the directions show the intensity belongs to which agent and towards which one.
The colors of the nodes represent the state of the agents at that time, red as defector and green as cooperator.
show the CMC within a group of N = 20 agents and
CMC within the subsystem of the 10 agents (CMCS)
who were not exchanged with zealots after time tz. The
top-left panel, shows the CMC and CMCS between the
agents which used SAL to update their decisions, before
and after 10 of them being replaced by zealots at time
tz = 2.5 × 105. There is a drop in the CMC because of
the inevitable pairings between the SAL-agents and the
zealots. The CMCS between the 10 agents who were not
switched with zealots increased after their interactions
with the zealots, despite the overall decrease in the CMC
in the system. In other words, the agents of the subgroup
S improved their mutual cooperation from about 0.1 to
about 0.25. This is because when the agent of subsystem
S is randomly paired with a zealot of the subsystem S,
with high probability, it ended up as a sucker and received
the minimum payoff of zero. The agent used this payoff
as a measure on which to base its next decision. When
an agent of subsystem S paired with another agent of the
same subsystem, with high chance (because of their past
experience of playing together) played C, but because of
the low payoff it received previously playing with a zealot,
still increases its tendency to play C with this agent.
The top-right panel in Figure 10 depicts the CMC and
CMCS between agents used SALT to make decisions,
before and after the switching time tz = 2.5 × 105. Al-
though SALT highly increased the CMC level, it failed
to sustain that level due to the influence of the zealots.
After the switching time tz only the agents of the sub-
system S contributed to the mutual cooperation.
The bottom-left panel in the figure depicts the advan-
tage of adding the SAC to the SAL mechanism in sus-
taining the CMC of the system after the switching time
tz = 2.5 × 106. This figure shows that after the time tz
the CMCS of the subsystem S increases, as the only
contribution for mutual cooperation, and saturates at
about 0.85. The bottom-right panel of the figure shows
the CMC and CMCS of the agents use SALTC (en-
tire SA algorithm) to update their decisions. The panel
shows a very high resilience of the system even after this
massive number of SA-agents switched to zealots at time
tz = 2.5×106. Similar to the system governed by SALC,
there is a drop in the CMC but the agents could sus-
tain the level of CMCS to about 0.95. This is because
the SA-agents of this system learned to disconnect them-
selves from the zealots using the SAC mechanism, which
highly increased the robustness of the emerging mutual
cooperation. Notice that after the switching time tz all
the mutual cooperation occurs within subsystem S.
Figure 11 summarizes the influence a given fraction
of zealots within a group manifest under the different
learning mechanisms. The figure shows the saturated
value of CMCS of the SA agents, using different steps
of the SA algorithm for decision making, after a fraction
f of the agents turned to zealots at time tz. The more
adaptable the system, the higher the saturation value
of CMCS that can be achieved by the remaining (1-f)
agents. This provides us with a measure of the resilience
of the system. The solid curve is the saturated CMCS
for the agents using SAL as a function of the fraction (f)
of the agents who switched to zealots at time tz . For
f ¡ 0.4 (8 zealots) the system retains a CMCS slightly
above 0.4. Beyond this fraction of zealots there is an
exponential decay of CMCS . In this situation the SA
agents learn to modify their decisions (C orD) depending
on whether or not their pair is a zealot or another SA
agent using SAL to make its decisions.
The dashed curve in the figure is the saturated value
of the CMC of the SA agents, using SALT , after the
switching time tz. Introducing the SAT learning im-
proves the resilience of the system for f < 0.4 above that
of SAL alone. However, beyond f = 0.4 the calculation
converges with the earlier one indicating that the addi-
tional learning mechanism of trust ceases to be of value
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FIG. 10: The blue curves show the time evolution of the Chance of Mutual Cooperation (CMC) (chance of CC to
happen among 20 agents at time t) and the orange curves shows the CMC between 10 agents who didn’t forced to
be zealot. In top-left panel agents used SAL and in top-right panel used SALT to update their decisions while since
tz = 2.5× 105 10 of the agents forced to be zealots. In bottom-left panel the agents used SALC and in bottom-right
panel used SALTC to update their decisions while since tz = 2.5× 106 10 of the agents forced to be zealots.
N = 20, Tc = 0.9.
beyond a specific level of zealotry.
The two top curves of Figure 11 are saturated CMC
for the SA agents using SALC (doted curve) and
SALTC (dot-dash curve) to make decisions, after the
switching time tz. These two curves show substantial
improvement in the system’s resilience to an increase in
the fraction of zealots. Or said differently, the robust-
ness of the system to perturbations is insensitive to the
number of zealots, that is, until the zealots constitute
the majority of group membership. The SAC learning
in the decision making of the SA-agents have the abil-
ity to avoid pairing with the zealots. Once the fraction
of zealots exceeds 0.6 the resilience drops rapidly. The
saturated CMC for the SALTC is highest where the
three learning levels (decision, trust, connection) are ac-
tive, giving the SA-agents maximum adaptability, that is,
flexibility to change in order to maximize their self inter-
est. This realization of self-interest improves the payoff
of the whole system as well.
Notice that as the number of the zealots increases, it
takes longer for agents to agree to play, but when they
do play, they do so with a high propensity that they will
cooperate with each other. In other words, increasing the
number of zealots slows down the response of the system.
In Appendix B we show complementary analyses of the
evolution of the propensity of an agent to interact with
other agents after zealots are introduced, as well as the
snapshots of the propensities of connections among the
20 agents.
V. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF
RESULTS
The Selfish Algorithm provides a demonstration that
the benefit to an individual within a social group need not
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FIG. 11: Effect of ratio of the agents turned to the
zealots at tz = 2.5× 106 (x axis) on the saturated value
of the Chance of Mutual Cooperation (CMC) of the
remained agents evolved using different steps of the SA
algorithm; SAL (solid curve), SALT (dashed curve),
SALC (dot curve) and SALTC (dot-dash curve).
N = 20, Tc = 0.9.
be achieved at the cost of diminishing the overall benefit
to the group. Each individual within the group may act
out of self-interest, but the collective effect can be quite
different than what is obtained by the naive linear log-
ical extrapolation typically made in the tragedy of the
commons arguments [4]. In fact, the SA demonstrates
how robust cooperation can emerge out of the selfishness
of the individual members of a system that improve the
performance of each agent, as well as, that of the overall
group, resolving the altruism paradox.
A collective group intelligence emerges from the SA
calculations, one based on the self-interest of the indi-
vidual members of the group. This collective intelligence
grows spontaneously in the absence of explicit awareness
on the part of individuals of the outcomes of the be-
havior of other members of the group. Perhaps more
importantly, the collective intelligence develops without
assuming a pre-existing network structure to support the
collective behavior, and without assuming knowledge of
information about the actions or outcomes from other
members of the society.
As demonstrated in this research, collective intelligence
entailed by the SA unfolds as a consequence of three
learning mechanisms:
SAL supports reinforced learning based on the selfish-
ness of agents who play the PDG. An agent chooses C or
D in its play with other agents and agents influence one
another through their payoffs, resulting in the emergence
of mutual cooperation, that reveals a collective intelli-
gence.
SAT tunes the propensity of an agent to imitate the
strategy of their partner. The strength of the tuning is
proportional to the trust being beneficial or detrimental
to the agent itself. The role of SAT is to assist agents
in achieving coordination, which results in a reduction
in the formation of CD pairs. This reduction makes it
easier for the system to learn to select CC over CD over
time.
SAC tunes the propensity of an agent to connect to
other agents based on how they improved its self-interest.
We have studied the advantage of each of the SA
learning mechanisms in creating mutual cooperation and
thereby the facilitation of the growth of group intelli-
gence. We also studied the adaptation and resilience of
the emergent intelligence by replacing some of the agents
with zealots and examining the system’s response. The
control of the dynamics in SA is internal and according to
the self-interest of the agents, spontaneously directs the
system to robust self-organization. The most robust sys-
tems use the SAC mechanism to make decisions, which
increase the complexity of the system by forming a dy-
namic complex network with a high propensity for part-
nering, thereby providing the agents with the ability to
learn to shun the zealots. These complex temporal pair-
ings that emerge from SAC can be seen as a source of the
network reciprocity introduce by Nowak and May [13].
One advantage of the SA is its simplicity which en-
ables us to introduce additional behavioral mechanisms
into the dynamics such as deception or memory. This
makes it possible to create algorithms for different self-
organizing systems such as those used in voting. SA
leadership emerges anywhere and everywhere as the need
for it arises and it leads to socio-technical systems which
achieve optimum leadership activities in organizations to
make teams more effective at achieving their goals. The
model also has promise in the information and communi-
cation technology (ICT) field of sensor and sensor array
design. Future research will explore the application in
detecting deception in human - human or human - ma-
chine interactions and in anticipating threats or provid-
ing leaders with near real-time advice about the emerging
dynamics of a given specific situation.
The predictions in this work are entirely simulation-
based, however a number of them are being experimen-
tally tested. Experimental work (paper in preparation)
confirms the emergence of mutual cooperation between
human pairs playing PD when they are given the op-
tion to trust their pair’s decision, in no explicit aware-
ness of the payoffs to other agents. Additional experi-
ments to test our hypothesis that the collective coopera-
tion emerged by SA can survive to perturbations are in
progress.
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Appendix A: Details for the SA algorithm
The following steps are executed during a single cy-
cle initiated at time t of the SA algorithm depicted in
Figure 12
a. 1. Selfish algorithm - connection (SAC) Agents
i and j are picked randomly such that at time t the SAC
agent i has the propensity:
Pij(t) =
Mij(t)∑
kMik(t)
(2)
to play with agent j, where the propensity falls in the
interval 0 < Pij(t) < 1. The quantity Mij(t) is the cu-
mulative tendency for agent i to select agent j to play
at time t. This cumulative tendency changes at step 7,
according to the last two payoffs received by agent i.
At the same time, the SAC agent j has a propen-
sity given by Eq. (2), with the indices interchanged, to
play with agent i, where the propensity falls in the in-
terval 0 < Pji(t) < 1. Two agents i and j partner if two
numbers r1 and r2 are randomly chosen from the interval
(0,1), and satisfy inequalities r1 < Pij(t) and r2 < Pji(t).
If both inequalities are not satisfied another two agents
are randomly selected at each time t until the inequal-
ities are satisfied and the two agents ”agree” to play a
PDG. In the flowchart wherever letter r is called it re-
turns a single uniformly distributed random number in
the interval (0,1).
b. 2. Selfish algorithm - learning (SAL) Agent i,
playing with agent j, initially selects an action, C or D,
using SAL. The agent i has the propensity:
PCij(t) =
Cij(t)
Cij(t) +Dij(t)
(3)
to pick C and the propensity:
PDij(t) =
Dij(t)
Cij(t) +Dij(t)
(4)
to pick D, as it’s next potential decision. Note that the
sum of these two terms is one. The quantities Cij(t) and
Dij(t) are cumulative tendencies for agent i playing with
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agent j, at time t, for the choice C or D, respectively.
These cumulative tendencies change at step 6 based on
the last two payoffs of agent i.
To decide on an action a random number r is selected
from the interval (0,1). If r < PCij(t) then the next
decision of SAL agent i will be C, otherwise will be D.
The same reasoning applies for agent j.
c. 3. Selfish algorithm - trust (SAT ) Instead of ex-
ecuting the decision determined by SAL in step 2, agent
i has a propensity to trust the decision made by agent j,
which also used SAL in step 2. The propensity for agent
i to trust the decision of agent j is:
PTij(t) =
Tij(t)
Tij(t) + T ij(t)
. (5)
Here again, if a random number r, chosen from the in-
terval (0,1), is less than PTij(t) then trust is established.
The quantities Tij(t) and T ij(t) are cumulative tenden-
cies for agent i to execute the choice of agent j, at time t,
or to not rely on trust and to execute its choice based on
SAL, respectively. These cumulative tendencies update
in step 5 based on the last two payoffs of agent i.
d. 4. Evaluating Own Payoffs After agent i and j
executed their action, C or D, their payoff is evaluated
using the payoffs matrix of the PDG, Πij(t) and Πji(t),
respectively.
e. 5. Update of cumulative tendency of SAT If
agent i used SAT playing with agent j then the accu-
mulative tendencies Tij and T ij change to Tij + ∆i,jk
and T ij −∆i,jk for the next time agent i and j partner.
The same happens for agent j. Similarly, if agent i did
not use SAT , but relied on its own SAL, then the ac-
cumulative tendencies T ij and Tij change to T ij + ∆i,jk
and Tij −∆i,jk for the next time agent i and j partner.
The same happens for agent j.
f. 6. Update of cumulative tendency of SAL Step
6 is only active if the agent did not use SAT at step 3.
If agent i played C with agent j, then the accumulative
tendencies Cij and Dij change to Cij + ∆i,jk and Dij +
∆i,jk for the next time agent i and j partner. If agent i
played D with agent j, then the accumulative tendencies
Dij and Cij change to Dij +∆i,jk and Cij−∆i,jk for the
next time agent i and j partner. The same happens for
agent j.
g. 7. Update of cumulative tendency of SAC In this
step the cumulative tendency to play with a specific agent
changes. If agent i played with agent j then the cumu-
lative tendency of pairing with agent j, Mij changes to
Mij + ∆i,jk. The same happens for agent j.
As boundary condition for steps 5, 6 and 7, if the up-
dated cumulative tendency goes beyond its defined max-
imum (or below its defined minimum) then it has to set
back to the maximum value (minimum value).
Appendix B: Effect of zealots on the dynamics of
the SA
Figure 13 shows the time evolution of the propensity
of SAC of one agent 1 to other 19 agents, in system
of 20 agents which used SALT (left panel) or SALTC
(right panel) to make decision until tz where 10 (out of
the 19) agents turned to zealots. This figure shows that
agent 1, before t = tz, mostly played with the agent
corresponding to the purple or green curve of left or right
panel respectively. But after these agents switched to
zealots then agent 1 decreased its propensity to pair up
and play with them and switched to pair with the agent
corresponding to blue curves (not a zealot).
Figure 14 shows the snapshots of the propensities of
connections between 20 agents, using SALTC to make
decisions, before and after one of them turned to a zealot
(agent 10). This figure shows that the network is intelli-
gent and is able to isolate the zealot, in order to sustain
the highest level of mutual cooperation possible.
Appendix C: Effect of trust (fixed chance of trust)
on the evolution of decisions
The aim of this section is to highlight the difference be-
tween trust used in the literature with our dynamic trust.
We introduced ”trust” and ”not trust” as a ”decision”
(while the word trust means ”not making a decision”).
We connected trust to a reinforcement learning mecha-
nism to make it adaptable. To show the difference, here
we determine the effect of fixed chance of trust between
the agents on the dynamics of decisions where there is no
reinforcement learning active, which is to say that trust
is the only learning mechanism through SAT . We in-
vestigated the dynamics of the decisions made by social
groups consisting of 10, 20, or 30 agents. These agents
randomly partner at time t and can either retain their
decision, or exchange it with a fixed chance for their part-
ner’s decision (trusting). In left panel of Figure 15 the
average time for the agents to reach consensus is plotted
versus the chance of trust that agents have to take the
decision of their partner as their next decision in each of
the three groups. This figure shows that there is a broad
flat minimum (optimum) value of trust that leads the
agents to achieving consensus faster and that this time
increases with the size of the network.
It is interesting to note that the evolution of mutual
cooperation when one of the agents becomes a zealot,
which is to say, that agent remains the same all the time,
the network rapidly relaxes to the value of the zealot.
The conclusion is that this network is highly sensitive to
this small perturbation depending on the chance of trust.
In other words, this system, that learns only through
trust is not significantly resilient (is not robust).
The panel on the right of the Figure 15 indicates a
dependence of the average time for a group to reach con-
sensus from a random initial state is a monotonously
15
FIG. 12: Flowchart of the SA. ”Y” and ”N” letters represent ”Yes” and ”No”, respectively.
FIG. 13: Time evolution of the propensity of agent 1 to pair with the other 19 agents P1j , where agents used SALC
(left panel) and SALTC (right panel) before tz = 2.5× 106 and after tz 10 of the agents (out of 19) turned to
zealots. N = 20, Tc = 0.9.
increasing function of group size N. The average time
to reach consensus satisfies an allometry equation [24]:
Y = aXb, where Y is the functionality of the system, X
is a measure of system size and the empirical parame-
ters a and b are determined by data. Allometry relations
(ARs) have only recently been applied to social phenom-
ena [25] but on those applications the scaling has always
been superlinear (b¿1). Bettencourt [25] point out that
the superlinear scale reflects unique social characteristics
with no equivalent in biology in which the ARs scaling
is invariably sublinear (b¡1). They point out that the
knowledge spillover in urban settings drive the growth
of functionality such as wages, income, gross domestic
product, bank deposits, as well as rates of invention...all
scale superlinearly with city size.
In this paper the agents were allowed to learn through
a variety of modalities and to find their individual opti-
mum value of trust regarding other agents. Subsequently,
we showed that this dynamic trust acting, in concert with
other learning modalities, leads to robust mutual coop-
eration.
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FIG. 14: Complex adaptation in the dynamic network emerged by SA. From left to right the panels show the
snapshots of the propensities of connections between 20 agents at t = 1, t = 5× 105 and t = 106, respectively.
Agents played the PDG and updated their decisions based on SALTC except agent 16 (red node on the left panel)
which turned to a zealot and kept defecting after tz = 5× 105. Intensity of the lines between pairs represent the
magnitude of the propensity of one to another and the directions show the intensity belongs to which agent and
towards which one. The colors of the nodes represent the state of the agents at that time, red as defector and green
as cooperator. M = 20, Tc = 0.9.
FIG. 15: Left panel: The black, red and blue curves show the average time to reach consensus (the time that all the
agents reach in +1 or all in -1 state) vs. the magnitude of the trust between them for systems with 10, 20, and 30
agents, respectively. At each time an agent can keep its previous decision or can imitate the decision of its partner
by the fixed propensity of trust. Right panel: Dependence of the average time to consensus to the number of the
agents with 0.1 (black), 0.5 (red) and 0.9 chance of trusting the decision of their pair. The power law coefficients for
Nα are 2.37, 2.28 and 2.29, respectively. The curves are ensemble averages over 100 realizations.
